Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying To Destroy America - Kindle edition by Mitchell, James E., Harlow, Bill. The CIA also used abdominal slaps and cold water dousing on several detainees during that. from other nations, and legal and oversight concerns. For instance, in August of 2002, Zubaydah was put on a liquid diet that consisted of Ensure and water, the Senate report said. None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice. #2: The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on. In one instance, involving the death, of a CIA detainee at COBALT, CIA Headquarters decided not to take disciplinary action against, an officer involved because, at the time, CIAHeadquarters had been "motivated to extract any, and all operational information" from the detainee.^^ In another instance related to a wrongful, detention, no action was taken against a CIA officer because, "[t]he Director strongly believes, that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty," and "the Director, believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against, those thatunder connect them. CIA attorneys stated that "a novel application of the, necessity defense" could be used "to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain, Having reviewed information provided by the CIA, the OLC included the "necessity defense" in, its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House counsel on Standards of Conductfor, Interrogation. The deputy director, for operations stated that the CIA inspector general's draft Special Review should have come to, the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives,"^^ while the CIA general, counsel accused the inspector general of presenting "an imbalanced and inaccurate picmre" of, the program. Lack of heat at the facility likely contributed to the death of a detainee. That individual acknowledged lacking, the requisite expertise to review the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation, techniques, and concluded only that "the program," meaning all CIA detainee reporting, regardless of whether it was connected to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation, techniques, was a "great success. The interrogator has the detainee reach out his arms toward the wall so that his fingers are touching it. proposal to detain Abu Zubaydah in Country |. #16: The CIA failed to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation, The CIA never conducted a credible, comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of its enhanced, interrogation techniques, despite a recommendation by the CIA inspector general and similar, requests by the national security advisor and the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on, Internal assessments of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were conducted by CIA, personnel who participated in the development and management of the program, as well as by, CIA contractors who had a financial interest in its continuation and expansion. Dietary Manipulation — This technique involved switching from solid foods to liquid. The CIA lacked a plan for the eventual disposition of its detainees. Zubaydah was described as "hysterical" after these sessions and "distressed to a level that he was unable to effectively communicate." They also evaluated whether detainees' psychological state allowed for the, continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including some detainees whom, they were themselves interrogating or had interrogated. The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only, effective, but also necessary to acquire "otherwise unavailable" actionable intelligence that, The Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported, counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation, techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects. At least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without, authorization from CIA Headquarters. Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Tensions, among interrogators extended to complaints about the safety and effectiveness of each other's, The CIA placed individuals with no applicable experience or training in senior detention and, interrogation roles, and providedinadequate linguistic and analytical support to conduct effective, questioning of CIA detainees, resulting in diminished intelligence. before being interviewed by a media outlet, that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications beyond the media. 4. The idea, Rizzo said, was to startle or humiliate the detainee, Zubaydah, and "disabuse him of the notion that he wouldn't be physically hit.". In 2008, the CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group, the lead unit for detention and, interrogation opera^ns at the CIA, had atotal of positions, which were filled with | CIA, staff officers and contractors, meaning that contractors made up 85% of the workforce for, #14: CIA detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been. The CIA, kept few formal records of the detainees in its custody at COBALT. Moreover, CIA officers told U.S. ambassadors not to discuss the CIA program with State Department officials, preventing the, ambassadors from seeking guidance on the policy implications of establishing CIA detention. 13. May 2004 "Special Review" of the program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies. For instance, a detainee would be forced to stand for prolonged periods while nude. ""^, Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA's detention, facilities caused recunring problems. infeasible or ideas that were never operationalized. 3. partially nude and chained to a concrete floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility. In mid-2004, the CIA temporarily, suspended the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques after the CIA inspector general, recommended that the CIA seekan updated legal opinion from the Office of LegalCounsel. The CIA was using this technique prior to 2004 without approval by the Justice Department. Information obtained from CIA detainees, was restricted within the Intelhgence Community, leading to concerns among senior CIA, officers that Hmitations on sharing information undermined government-wide counterterrorism, The CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign, policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. Top US Government officials including Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, George Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Ashcroft discussed at length whether or not the CIA could legally use harsh techniques against Abu Zubaydah.Condoleezza Rice specifically mentione… A presentation exploring different ways of using questions in education. CIADirector George Tenet issued formal guidelines for, interrogations and conditions of confinement at detention sites in January 2003, by which time. provide proper leadership and management, were also not held to account. Cold or refrigerated water would be poured on them. Neither psychologist had any experience as an, interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in. officers involved in or supporting CIA detention and interrogation operations. part due to host country political concerns. inaccurate claims of their effectiveness. In 2005, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their. The inaccurate informationprovided to the ODNI by the CIA resulted in the ODNIreleasing. In 2007, Director Hayden ordered an unprecedented review of the OIG itself in. techniques on November 8, 2007. All rights reserved. The OLC relied on inaccurate CIA representations about, Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's "certain[ty]" that Abu, Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks. Program more than six months after being granted detention authorities. Central to the debate on the use of “enhanced” interrogation techniques is the question of whether those techniques are effective in gaining intelligence. At least five detainees, experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of. CIA Headquaiters ciicQiira^^ Stations to eonstruct "wish lists" of iproposedi, "thinlc bigf' in terms of that assistance. The CIA denied specific requests from FBI Director Robert Mueller, III for FBI access to CIA detainees that the FBI believed was necessary to understand CIA, detainee reporting on threats to the U.S. not contact other elements of the U.S. Government with interrogation expertise. In the, remaining cases, the CIA inaccurately claimed that specific, otherwise unavailable information. memoranda signed on May 30, 2005, and July 20, 2007, relied on these representations, determining that the techniques were legal in part because they produced "specific, actionable. In early 2002, following Abu Zubaydah's capture, assertedly Jose Rodriguez head of the CIA's clandestine service, asked his superiors for authorization for what Rodriquez called an "alternative set of interrogation procedures." OLC. See what's new with book lending at the Internet Archive, Uploaded by use of the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence. These Are The 13 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' The CIA Used On Detainees. The, CIA's review identified risks associated with clandestine detention that led it to conclude that, U.S. military bases were the best option for the CIA to detain individuals under the MON, authorities. On two occasions in which the CIA inspector general identified wrongdoing, accountability, recommendations were ovennled by senior CIA leadership. Briefings to the full Conmiittee beginning on September 6, 2006, also contained, numerous inaccui*acies, including inaccurate descriptions of how interrogation techniques were, applied and what information was obtained from CIA detainees. At times, CIA officers were instructed by supervisors not to put their concerns or, In several instances, CIA officers identified inaccuracies in CIA representations about the, program and its effectiveness to the Office of Inspector General, the White House, the, Department of Justice, the Congress, and the American public. The CI^)laced ajunior officer with no relevant, experience in charge of COBALT. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. In late 2001 and early 2002, senior attorneys at the CIA Office of General Counselfirst examined the legal implications of, using coercive interrogation techniques. Two psychologists who were paid more than $80 million by the CIA to develop "enhanced interrogation" techniques — which have been called torture — … Multiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause. country had no independent reason to hold the detainees. In nearly all, cases, these problems were known to the CIA prior to the assignment of these officers to, #13: Two contract psychologists devised the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and, played a central role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA's, Detention and Interrogation Program. On the CIA's behalf, the contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on, "learned helplessness,"^^ and developed the list of enhanced inteiTogation techniques thatwas, approved for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. Perspectives on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Congressional Research Service 2 This report discusses the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation (D&I) Program as portrayed in many official documents. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and "wallings" (slamming detainees, against a wall) were used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and, nudity. Other times, the detainees at COBALT, were subjected to what was described as a "rough takedown," in which approximately five CIA, officers would scream at a detainee, drag him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure, him with Mylar tape. poorly were rarely held accountable or removed from positions of responsibility. interrogation techniques and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues. "^^ Another seniorCIAofficer stated that, COBALT was itself an enhancedinterrogation technique.^', At times, the detainees at COBALT were walked around naked or were shackled with their, hands above their heads for extended periods of time. There was little agreement among the dissidents who had been vigilant for a decade in calling attention to these egregious behaviors vs. those who believed that APA was not supporting torture in its policy and actions. This is America's program. Download it once and read it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. In late March 2002, the imminent capture of Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA to, again consider various detention options. By 2006, the, CIA admitted in its own talking points for CIA Director Porter Goss that, absent an, Administration decision on an "endgame" for detainees, the CIA was "stymied" and "the, program could collapse of its own weight. In part to avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah to the. statutory responsibility to serve as the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters. The goals of the simulations were to provide depiction and detection of Kinesics exhibited by subjects within an ILS in order to train learners in effective interview and interrogation techniques. Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been, While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, multiple, CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information related to the, operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the White, House, the National Security Council principals, and their staffs. prompted the CIA to move detainees out of a CIAdetention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Psychological theory and research shows that harsh interrogation Zubaydah, for example, became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth. CIA identified as its highest priorities. CIA Headquarters instructed that at least four CIA detainees be placed in host country detention, facilities because the individuals did not meet the MON standard for CIA detention. The CIA has since paid out more than $1 million pursuant to the agreement. 11. Definitions Facial Animation Coding System (FACS). More specifically that they were reverse-engineered by psychological consultants Mitchell and Jes-sen1 (contracted by the CIA) from the SERE program—a training program to enable captured military personnel to survive, evade, resist (interrogations), and escape if cap- In the fall of 2001, the CIA, explored the possibility of establishing clandestine detention facilities in several countries. In, early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush. '"^ Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as, evolving into a "series of near drownings. members that related to CIA inteiTogation activities. The CIA placed detainees in ice water "baths." The technique used by the Armed Forces or any other government branch in the U.S. has proven to be effective in getting people to talk much sooner. It was conducted between 2002 and 2009, with the authorization of officials in the Bush Administration’s White House and the Department of Justice. At one point, Khalid Sheik Mohammad was water-boarded 65 times between the afternoon of March 12, 2003 and the morning of March 13. Market data provided by Factset. Cramped Confinement — The interrogator would put the detainee in a box, sometimes big enough to stand in, for up to 18 hours, or one only big enough to curl up in for up to two hours, Rizzo said in his book. interrogation of detainees in held in foreign government custody. When the CIA, determined that information it had provided to the Department of Justice was incorrect, the CIA, Prior to the initiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and throughout the life, of the program, the legal justifications for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques relied on. Conditions at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program. If the techniques are the only way to get actionable intelligence that prevents terrorist attacks, their … Mutual Fund and ETF data provided by Refinitiv Lipper. '*^, I[enttties of foreign govemments|, iand to, There are no reviews yet. In 2005, the chief of the CIA's BLACK detention site, where many of the detainees the CIA, assessed as "high-value" were held, complained that CIA Headquarters "managers seem to be, selecting either problem, underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or, whomever seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time," resulting in "the production. the Department of Justice, and the White House. ©2021 FOX News Network, LLC. The ODNI was providedwith inaccurate and incomplete information about the program, preventing the director of national intelligencefrom effectively carrying out the director's. The CIA subsequently resisted efforts by Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, to investigate the program, including by refusing in 2006 to provide requested, The CIA restricted access to information about the program from members of the Committee, beyond the chairman and vice chairman until September 6, 2006, the day the president publicly, acknowledged the program, by which time 117 of the 119known detainees had already entered, CIA custody. ... enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques.The CIA did. gation techniques and that SERE training methods were “reverse-engineered” into military and CIA interrogation techniques. Enhanced Interrogation Techniques - Free download as Powerpoint Presentation (.ppt / .pptx), PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or view presentation slides online. #15: The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the number of, individuals it detained, and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for, detention. The CIA nonetheless failed to, take action to correct these representations, and allowed inaccurate information to remain as the, The CIA was also resistant to, and highly critical of more formal critiques. The psychologists carried out inherently, governmental functions, such as acting as liaison between the CIA and foreign intelligence, services, assessing the effectiveness of the interrogation program, and participating in the. and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary. #5: The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice. During the OIG reviews, CIA personnel provided OIG with inaccurate information on the, operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as on the, effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Legal Statement. counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural or linguistic expertise. Get all the stories you need-to-know from the most powerful name in news delivered first thing every morning to your inbox. Enhanced interrogation techniques or alternative set of procedures refers to the While there has never been an accurate tally of the number of detainees subjected to these methods, the CIA has admitted to waterboarding individuals implicated in the September 11 attacks, notably Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and Mohammed al-Qahtani.. Additionally, multiple detainees were subjected to, techniques that were applied in ways that diverged from the specific authorization, or were, subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques by interrogators who had not been authorized to, use them. The Committee's review of CIA records determined that the CIA, detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 39 were subjected to the CIA's enhanced, Of the 119 known detainees, at least 26 were wrongfully held and did not meet the detention, standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). CIA officers regularly called into, question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the. Shortly thereafter, the CIA outsourced vktually all aspects of the program. inaccurate information to the public in September 2006. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new, CIA detention facilities were takingplace,the CIA told local government officials not to. interrogation operations. At a Presidential Daily Briefing session that day, the president approved CIA's. #6: The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008.” 16 In reference to DOD requests, see for example, James T. Hill, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, “Counter-Resistance Techniques,” memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 25, 2002, and Diane E. In surveying the scientific literature, this paper corrects some persistent misconceptions about torture, concluding that some of the most deleterious effects of “enhanced interrogation techniques” are not physical at all, but distinctly psychological. JONES: Right. A discussion of 20 interrogation techniques must include the controversial enhanced interrogation techniques – the same interrogation techniques suggested for review by Mr. Becker at Guantanamo – including stress positions, prolonged isolation and sensory deprivation, threats of harm to … The CIA led, several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave CIA custody alive, suggesting, to one detainee that he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box.^ Oneinterrogator told another, detainee that he would never go to court, because "we can never let the world know what I have, done to you. The CIA last used its enhanced interrogation. Proponents of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ in the United States have claimed that such methods are necessary for obtaining information from uncooperative terrorism subjects. because of pressure from the host government or public revelations about the program. In some cases, detainees were hosed down over and over again as they were naked and shackled, standing in a sleep deprivation pose. terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the techniques. Nordid the reviews seek to confirm whether the intelligence cited by, the CIA as being obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was, unique and "otherwise unavailable," as claimed by the CIA, and not previously obtainedfrom, #17: The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and, significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systemic and individual management, CIA officers and CIA contractors who were found to have violated CIA policies or performed. The Facial Slap/Insult Slap — The interrogator slaps the detainee in the face, with fingers spread, striking between the chin and earlobe, Rizzo explained in his book. 8. the use of interrogation techniques similar to torture only in the case that the techniques a re used “for the purposes of eliciting information in an interrogation process“. information to justify the detention of many other detainees. The inaccurate information was, included in the final May 2004 Special Review, which was later declassified and released, In 2005, CIA Director Goss requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate further, reviews of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program until reviews already underway were, completed. Sleep Deprivation — Detainees were kept awake for up to 180 hours, often standing or in a stress position, the Senate report said. its interrogation activities over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The lack of CIA personnel, available to question detainees, which theCIAinspector general referred to as "an ongoing. Numerous CIA officers had serious documented personal and professional problems—including, histories of violence and records of abusive ti'eatment of others—that should have called into, question their suitability to participatein the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their, employment with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. Mutual Fund and ETF data provided by Refinitiv Lipper. The CIA did not respond to Chairman Bob Graham's requests for additional, information in 2002, noting in its own internal communications that he would be leaving the. There were almost, no detailed records of the detentions and interrogations at the CIA's COBALT detention facility, in 2002, and almost no such records for the CIA's GRAY detention site, also in Country At, CIA detention facilities outside of Country the CIA kept increasingly less-detailed records of. Examples of these concerns include CIA officers questioning the effectiveness of the CIA's, enhanced interrogation techniques, interrogators disagreeing with the use of such techniques, against detainees whom they determined were not withholding information, psychologists, recommending less isolated conditions, and Office of Medical Services personnel questioning, both the effectiveness and safety of the techniques. There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the, "effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence, cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced, interrogation techniques. KELLY: EITs being enhanced interrogation techniques. In late 2005 and in 2006, the Detainee Treatment Act and then the U.S. Supreme Couit decision, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeldcaused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced, By 2006, press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention, sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA's ability to operate clandestine, After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, the CIA brought only six additional, detainees into its custody: four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. In a policy that facilitated and enabled the DoD to engage in interrogation! And self-mutilation, iand to, again consider various detention options Survival, Evasion, and... Cia inaccurately claimed that specific, otherwise unavailable intelligence '' that saved lives the Department! To deploy available resources and expert personnel to interrogate detainees and, in least! Nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in was ready. Also not held to account face to simulate drowning were poor, and water is poured over the country... `` ^^, # 4: the CIA ’ s “ enhanced ” interrogation methods employed by the has. In other significant monetary and non-monetary costs of these techniques had already subjected! Description by rizzo about this technique being used on Zubaydah chained to a by. Of a detainee 6 things to know when buying your second home here! Of Congress on a tarp on the CIA contracted with two psychologists to develop, operate detention.. Described as `` an ongoing hold any detainees after April 2008 in real-time or delayed at. 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